(not in accordance with rules of conduct)

1) (wrong) unrichtig; ungeeignet [Werkzeug]

2) (unseemly) ungehörig; unpassend; (indecent) unanständig

3) (not in accordance with rules of conduct) unangebracht; unzulässig [Gebühren]

* * *

- academic.ru/37191/impropriety">impropriety

* * *

[ɪmˈprɒpəʳ, AM -ˈprɑ:pɚ]

1. (not correct) unrichtig, unzulässig, falsch; (showing bad judgement) fälschlich

2. (inappropriate) clothing, actions unpassend, nicht korrekt; (indecent) unanständig

\improper conduct unschickliches Benehmen [o Verhalten]

to make \improper suggestions to sb ( also iron) jdm einen unsittlichen Antrag machen

3. (dishonest)

\improper use Veruntreuung f, Zweckentfremdung f (of von + dat)

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* * *

improper [ımˈprɒpə; US ımˈprɑpər] adj (adv improperly)

1. ungeeignet, unpassend

2. unanständig, unschicklich (Benehmen etc)

3. ungenau, inexakt

4. MATH unecht (Bruch):

improper integral uneigentliches Integral

* * *

1) (wrong) unrichtig; ungeeignet [Werkzeug]

2) (unseemly) ungehörig; unpassend; (indecent) unanständig

3) (not in accordance with rules of conduct) unangebracht; unzulässig [Gebühren]

* * *

falsch adj.

nicht angemessen adj.

ungeeignet adj.

ungenau adj.

unpassend adj.

   1) The Book of Nature Is Written in the Language of Mathematics

   Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)

   2) Arranging Speech so as to Reply Appropriately

   It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)

   3) No Other Animal Has the Language Capacity of the Human

   It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)

   4) Human Beings Do Not Live Only in the World of Objects

   Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)

   5) Language Powerfully Conditions All Our Thinking

   It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)

   6) A List of Language Games

   [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]

   Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it

   Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another

   LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)

   7) Language Constrains Certain Modes of Interpretation

   We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)

   8) We Dissect Nature in Accordance with Our Native Languages

   We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.

   The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

   9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language

   The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)

    10) The Analysis of Certain Types of Utterances

   It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)

    11) The Dictionary of a Language Is a System of Concepts

   In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)

    12) Talk about the Evolution of the Language Capacity is Beside the Point

   In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)

    13) The Development of Language

   [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)

    14) Sentential and Conceptual Levels in Language

   he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.

   The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)

    15) Linguistic Realities Have Not Yet Been Captured by Theoretical Models

   The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.

   But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)

    16) The Final Steps to Human Language

   The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)

    17) The Inadequacy of Formal Linguistic Models for Ordinary Language Usage

    t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)

    18) When a Language Is an Abstract Machine

   A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)

    19) Metaphor and Metonymy Underpin the Formation of Linguistic Signs

   Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)

    20) Language and the Analysis of Nature

   It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)

    21) Correspondence Rules for Mapping Old Theory into Subsets of New Theory

   First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....

   Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)

    22) The Inclusion of Non- linguistic Factors in a Theory of Grammar

   If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)

    23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction

   Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)

    24) The Genetic Blueprints of Language

   By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)

    25) Languages Are Machines

   Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

νόμος, ου, ὁ (νέμω; [Zenodotus reads ν. in Od. 1, 3] Hes.+; loanw. in rabb.—On the history of the word MPohlenz, Nomos: Philol 97, ’48, 135–42; GShipp, Nomos ‘Law’ ’78; MOstwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy ’69). The primary mng. relates to that which is conceived as standard or generally recognized rules of civilized conduct esp. as sanctioned by tradition (Pind., Fgm. 152, 1=169 Schr. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς; cp. SEG XVII, 755, 16: Domitian is concerned about oppressive practices hardening into ‘custom’; MGigante, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ [Richerche filologiche 1] ’56). The synonym ἔθος (cp. συνήθεια) denotes that which is habitual or customary, especially in reference to personal behavior. In addition to rules that take hold through tradition, the state or other legislating body may enact ordinances that are recognized by all concerned and in turn become legal tradition. A special semantic problem for modern readers encountering the term ν. is the general tendency to confine the usage of the term ‘law’ to codified statutes. Such limitation has led to much fruitless debate in the history of NT interpretation.—HRemus, Sciences Religieuses/Studies in Religion 13, ’84, 5–18; ASegal, Torah and Nomos in Recent Scholarly Discussion, ibid., 19–27.

① a procedure or practice that has taken hold, a custom, rule, principle, norm (Alcman [VII B.C.], Fgm. 93 D² of the tune that the bird sings; Ocellus [II B.C.] c. 49 Harder [1926] τῆς φύσεως νόμος; Appian, Basil. 1 §2 πολέμου ν., Bell. Civ. 5, 44 §186 ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ σοῦ νόμου=under this rule of yours that governs action; Polyaenus 5, 5, 3 ν. πόμπης; 7, 11, 6 ν. φιλίας; Sextus 123 τοῦ βίου νόμος; Just., A II, 2, 4 παρὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως ν.; Ath. 3, 1 νόμῳ φύσεως; 13, 1 θυσιῶν νόμῳ)

ⓐ gener. κατὰ νόμον ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης in accordance w. the rule of an external commandment Hb 7:16. εὑρίσκω τὸν νόμον I observe an established procedure or principle or system Ro 7:21 (ν. as ‘principle’, i.e. an unwritten rightness of things Soph., Ant. 908). According to Bauer, Paul uses the expression νόμος (which dominates this context) in cases in which he prob. would have preferred another word. But it is also prob. that Paul purposely engages in wordplay to heighten the predicament of those who do not rely on the gospel of liberation from legal constraint: the Apostle speaks of a principle that obligates one to observe a code of conduct that any sensible pers. would recognize as sound and valid ὁ νόμος τ. νοός μου vs. 23b (s. νοῦς 1a). Engaged in a bitter struggle w. this νόμος there is a ἕτερος νόμος which, in contrast to the νοῦς, dwells ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου in my (physical) members vs. 23a, and hence is a νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας vs. 23c and 25b or a νόμος τ. ἁμαρτίας καὶ τ. θανάτου 8:2b. This sense prepares the way for the specific perspective

ⓑ of life under the lordship of Jesus Christ as a ‘new law’ or ‘system’ of conduct that constitutes an unwritten tradition ὁ καινὸς ν. τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 2:6; in brief ν. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ IMg 2 (cp. Just., D. 11, 4; 43, 1; Mel., P. 7, 46). Beginnings of this terminology as early as Paul: ὁ ν. τοῦ Χριστοῦ =the standard set by Christ Gal 6:2 (as vs. 3 intimates, Christ permitted himself to be reduced to nothing, thereby setting the standard for not thinking oneself to be someth.). The gospel is a νόμος πίστεως a law or system requiring faith Ro 3:27b (FGerhard, TZ 10, ’54, 401–17) or ὁ ν. τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰ. the law of the spirit (=the spirit-code) of life in Chr. J. 8:2a. In the same sense Js speaks of a ν. βασιλικός (s. βασιλικός) 2:8 or ν. ἐλευθερίας vs. 12 (λόγος ἐλ. P⁷⁴), ν. τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας 1:25 (association w. 1QS 10:6, 8, 11 made by EStauffer, TLZ 77, ’52, 527–32, is rejected by SNötscher, Biblica 34, ’53, 193f. On the theme of spontaneous moral achievement cp. Pind., Fgm. 152 [169 Schr.] 1f νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς | θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων | ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον| ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί=custom is lord of all, of mortals and immortals both, and with strong hand directs the utmost power of the just. Plut., Mor. 780c interprets Pindar’s use of νόμος: ‘not written externally in books or on some wooden tablets, but as lively reason functioning within him’ ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγῳ; Aristot., EN 4, 8, 10 οἷον ν. ὢν ἑαυτῷ; Diod S 1, 94, 1 ν. ἔγγραπτος; cp. also Ovid, Met. 1, 90 sponte sua sine lege fidem rectumque colebat; Mayor, comm. ‘Notes’ 73.—RHirzel, ΑΓΡΑΦΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ 1903.). Some would put ὁ νόμος Js 2:9 here (s. LAllevi, Scuola Cattol. 67, ’39, 529–42), but s. 2b below.—Hermas too, who in part interprets Israel’s legal tradition as referring to Christians, sees the gospel, exhibited in Christ’s life and words, as the ultimate expression of God’s will or ‘law’. He says of Christ δοὺς αὐτοῖς (i.e. the believers) τὸν ν., ὅν ἔλαβε παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ Hs 5, 6, 3, cp. Hs 8, 3, 3. Or he sees in the υἱὸς θεοῦ κηρυχθεὶς εἰς τὰ πέρατα τῆς γῆς, i.e. the preaching about the Son of God to the ends of the earth, the νόμος θεοῦ ὁ δοθεὶς εἰς ὅλον. τ. κόσμον 8, 3, 2. Similarly to be understood are τηρεῖν τὸν ν. 8, 3, 4. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ν. παθεῖν 8, 3, 6. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ν. θλίβεσθαι 8, 3, 7. ἀρνησάμενοι τὸν νόμον ibid. βλασφημεῖν τὸν ν. 8, 6, 2.

② constitutional or statutory legal system, law

ⓐ gener.: by what kind of law? Ro 3:27. ν. τῆς πόλεως the law of the city enforced by the ruler of the city (ν. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γραπτός Orig., C. Cels. 5, 37, 2); the penalty for breaking it is banishment Hs 1:5f. τοῖς ν. χρῆσθαι observe the laws 1:3; πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ν. obey the established laws Dg 5:10; νικᾶν τοὺς ν. ibid. (νικάω 3). Ro 7:1f, as well as the gnomic saying Ro 4:15b and 5:13b, have been thought by some (e.g. BWeiss, Jülicher) to refer to Roman law, but more likely the Mosaic law is meant (s. 3 below).

ⓑ specifically: of the law that Moses received from God and is the standard according to which membership in the people of Israel is determined (Diod S 1, 94, 1; 2: the lawgiver Mneves receives the law from Hermes, Minos from Zeus, Lycurgus from Apollo, Zarathustra from the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, Zalmoxis from Hestia; παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις, Μωϋσῆς receives the law from the Ἰαὼ ἐπικαλούμενος θεός) ὁ ν. Μωϋσέως Lk 2:22; J 7:23; Ac 15:5. ν. Μωϋσέως Ac 13:38; Hb 10:28. Also ὁ ν. κυρίου Lk 2:23f, 39; GJs 14:1. ὁ ν. τοῦ θεοῦ (Theoph. Ant. 2, 14 [p. 136, 4]) Mt 15:6 v.l.; Ro 8:7 (cp. Tat. 7, 2; 32, 1; Ath. 3:2). ὁ ν. ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν, αὐτῶν etc. J 18:31; 19:7b v.l.; Ac 25:8. κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον ν. 24:6 v.l. (cp. Jos., Ant. 7, 131). ὁ πατρῷος ν. 22:3. τὸν ν. τῶν ἐντολῶν Eph 2:15. Since the context of Ac 23:29 ἐγκαλούμενον περὶ ζητημάτων τοῦ νόμου αὐτῶν points to the intimate connection between belief, cult, and communal solidarity in Judean tradition, the term νόμος is best rendered with an hendiadys: (charged in matters) relating to their belief and custom; cp. ν. ὁ καθʼ ὑμᾶς 18:15. Ro 9:31 (CRhyne, Νόμος Δικαιοσύνης and the meaning of Ro 10:4: CBQ 47, ’85, 486–99).—Abs., without further qualification ὁ ν. Mt 22:36; 23:23; Lk 2:27; J 1:17; Ac 6:13; 7:53; 21:20, 28; Ro 2:15 (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου the work of the law [=the moral product that the Mosaic code requires] is written in the heart; difft. Diod S 1, 94, 1 ν. ἔγγραπτος, s. 1b, above), 18, 20, 23b, 26; 4:15a, 16; 7:1b, 4–7, 12, 14, 16; 8:3f; 1 Cor 15:56; Gal 3:12f, 17, 19, 21a, 24; 5:3, 14; 1 Ti 1:8 (GRudberg, ConNeot 7, ’42, 15); Hb 7:19 (s. Windisch, Hdb. exc. ad loc.), 28a; 10:1; cp. Js 2:9 (s. 1b above); μετὰ τὸν ν. Hb 7:28b; οἱ ἐν τῷ ν. Ro 3:19; κατὰ τὸν ν. according to the (Mosaic) law (Jos., Ant. 14, 173; 15, 51 al.; Just., D. 10, 1) J 19:7b; Ac 22:12; 23:3; Hb 7:5; 9:22. παρὰ τ. νόμον contrary to the law (Jos., Ant. 17, 151, C. Ap. 2, 219; Ath. 1, 3 παρὰ πάντα ν.) Ac 18:13.—νόμος without the art. in the same sense (on the attempt, beginning w. Origen, In Ep. ad Ro 3:7 ed. Lomm. VI 201, to establish a difference in mng. betw. Paul’s use of ὁ νόμος and νόμος s. B-D-F §258, 2; Rob. 796; Mlt-Turner 177; Grafe [s. 3b below] 7–11) Ro 2:13ab, 17, 23a, * 25a; 3:31ab; 5:13, 20; 7:1a (s. above); Gal 2:19b; 5:23 (JRobb, ET 56, ’45, 279f compares κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος Aristot., Pol. 1284a). δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται, ἀνόμοις δὲ … 1 Ti 1:9. Cp. ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος Ro 2:14 (in Pla., Pol. and in Stoic thought the wise person needed no commandment [Stoic. III 519], the bad one did; MPohlenz, Stoa ’48/49 I 133; II 75). Used w. prepositions: ἐκ ν. Ro 4:14; Gal 3:18, 21c (v.l. ἐν ν.); Phil 3:9 (ἐκ νόμου can also mean corresponding to or in conformity with the law: PRev 15, 11 ἐκ τῶν νόμων); cp. ἐκ τοῦ νόμου Ro 10:5. διὰ νόμου Ro 2:12b; 3:20b; 4:13; 7:7b; Gal 2:19a, 21; ἐν ν. (ἐν τῷ ν. Iren. 3, 11, 8 [Harv. II 49, 9]) Ro 2:12a, 23; Gal 3:11, 21c v.l.; 5:4; Phil 3:6. κατὰ νόμον 3:5; Hb 8:4; 10:8 (make an offering κατὰ νόμον as Arrian, Anab. 2, 26, 4; 5, 8, 2); χωρὶς ν. Ro 3:21a; 7:8f; ἄχρι ν. 5:13a. ὑπὸ νόμον 6:14f; 1 Cor 9:20; Gal 3:23; 4:4f, 21a; 5:18 (cp. Just., D. 45, 3 οἱ ὑπὸ τὸν ν.).—Dependent on an anarthrous noun παραβάτης νόμου a law-breaker Ro 2:25b ( 27b w. art.); Js 2:11. ποιητὴς ν. one who keeps the law 4:11d (w. art. Ro 2:13b). τέλος ν. the end of the law Ro 10:4 (RBultmann and HSchlier, Christus des Ges. Ende ’40). πλήρωμα ν. fulfilment of the law 13:10. ν. μετάθεσις a change in the law Hb 7:12. ἔργα ν. Ro 3:20a, 28; 9:32 v.l.; Gal 2:16; 3:2, 5, 10a.—(ὁ) ν. (τοῦ) θεοῦ Ro 7:22, 25a; 8:7 because it was given by God and accords w. his will. Lasting Mt 5:18; Lk 16:17 (cp. Bar 4:1; PsSol 10:4; Philo, Mos. 2, 14; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 277).—Used w. verbs, w. or without the art.: ν. ἔχειν J 19:7a; Ro 2:14 (ApcSed 14:5). πληροῦν ν. fulfill the law Ro 13:8; pass. Gal 5:14 (Mel., P. 42, 291). πληροῦν τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ν. fulfill the requirement of the law Ro 8:4. φυλάσσειν τὸν ν. observe the law Ac 21:24; Gal 6:13. τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ ν. φυλάσσειν observe the precepts of the law Ro 2:26; διώκειν ν. δικαιοσύνης 9:31a; πράσσειν ν. 2:25a. ποιεῖν τὸν ν. J 7:19b; Gal 5:3; Ro 2:14b, s. below; τὸν ν. τηρεῖν Js 2:10. τὸν ν. τελεῖν Ro 2:27. φθάνειν εἰς ν. 9:31b. κατὰ ν. Ἰουδαϊσμὸν ζῆν IMg 8:1 v.l. is prob. a textual error (Pearson, Lghtf., Funk, Bihlmeyer, Hilgenfeld; Zahn, Ign. v. Ant. 1873 p. 354, 1 [difft. in Zahn’s edition] all omit νόμον as a gloss and are supported by the Latin versions; s. Hdb. ad loc.). τὰ τοῦ ν. ποιεῖν carry out the requirements of the law Ro 2:14b (ApcSed 14:5; FFlückiger, TZ 8, ’52, 17–42). καταλαλεῖν νόμου, κρίνειν ν. Js 4:11abc. ἐδόθη ν. Gal 3:21a.—Pl. διδοὺς νόμους μου εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτῶν Hb 8:10; cp. 10:16 (both Jer 38:33).—Of an individual stipulation of the law ὁ νόμος τοῦ ἀνδρός the law insofar as it concerns the husband (Aristot., Fgm. 184 R. νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς.—SIG 1198, 14 κατὰ τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐρανιστῶν; Num 9:12 ὁ ν. τοῦ πάσχα; Philo, Sobr. 49 ὁ ν. τῆς λέπρας) Ro 7:2b; cp. 7:3 and δέδεται νόμῳ vs. 2a (on the imagery Straub 94f); 1 Cor 7:39 v.l.—The law is personified, as it were (Demosth. 43, 59; Aeschin. 1, 18; Herm. Wr. 12, 4 [the law of punishment]; IMagnMai 92a, 11 ὁ ν. συντάσσει; b, 16 ὁ ν. ἀγορεύει; Jos., Ant. 3, 274) J 7:51; Ro 3:19.

③ a collection of holy writings precious to God’s people, sacred ordinance

ⓐ in the strict sense the law=the Pentateuch, the work of Moses the lawgiver (Diod S 40, 3, 6 προσγέγραπται τοῖς νόμοις ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ὅτι Μωσῆς ἀκούσας τοῦ θεοῦ τάδε λέγει τ. Ἰουδαίοις=at the end of the laws this is appended: this is what Moses heard from God and is telling to the Jews. ὁ διὰ τοῦ ν. μεταξὺ καθαρῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων διαστείλας θεός Iren. 3, 12, 7 [Harv. II 60, 3]; cp. Hippol., Ref. 7, 34, 1) τὸ βιβλίον τοῦ νόμου Gal 3:10b (cp. Dt 27:26). Also simply ὁ νόμος (Jos., Bell. 7, 162 ὁ ν. or 2, 229 ὁ ἱερὸς ν. of the holy book in a concrete sense) Mt 12:5 (Num 28:9f is meant); J 8:5; 1 Cor 9:8 (cp. Dt 25:4); 14:34 (cp. Gen 3:16); Gal 4:21b (the story of Abraham); Hb 9:19. ὁ ν. ὁ ὑμέτερος J 8:17 (cp. Jos., Bell. 5, 402; Tat. 40, 1 κατὰ τοὺς ἡμετέρους ν.). ἐν Μωϋσέως νόμῳ γέγραπται 1 Cor 9:9. καθὼς γέγραπται ἐν νόμῳ κυρίου Lk 2:23 (γέγραπται ἐν νόμῳ as Athen. 6, 27, 23c; IMagnMai 52, 35 [III B.C.]; Mel., P. 11, 71; cp. Just., D. 8, 4 τὰ ἐν τῷ ν. γεγραμμένα); cp. vs. 24. ἔγραψεν Μωϋσῆς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ J 1:45 (cp. Cercidas [III B.C.], Fgm. 1, 18f Diehl² [=Coll. Alex. p. 204, 29=Knox p. 196] καὶ τοῦθʼ Ὅμηρος εἶπεν ἐν Ἰλιάδι).—The Sacred Scriptures (OT) referred to as a whole in the phrase ὁ ν. καὶ οἱ προφῆται (Orig., C. Cels. 2, 6, 4; cp. Hippol., Ref. 8, 19, 1) the law (הַתּוֹרָה) and the prophets (הַנְּבִיאִים) Mt 5:17; 7:12; 11:13; 22:40; Lk 16:16; Ac 13:15; 24:14; 28:23; Ro 3:21b; cp. Dg 11:6; J 1:45. τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ ν. Μωϋσέως καὶ τοῖς προφήταις καὶ ψαλμοῖς Lk 24:44.

ⓑ In a wider sense=Holy Scripture gener., on the principle that the most authoritative part gives its name to the whole (ὁ ν. ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Theoph. Ant. 1, 11 [p. 82, 15]): J 10:34 (Ps 81:6); 12:34 (Ps 109:4; Is 9:6; Da 7:14); 15:25 (Ps 34:19; 68:5); 1 Cor 14:21 (Is 28:11f); Ro 3:19 (preceded by a cluster of quotations fr. Psalms and prophets).—Mt 5:18; Lk 10:26; 16:17; J 7:49.—JHänel, Der Schriftbegriff Jesu 1919; OMichel, Pls u. s. Bibel 1929; SWesterholm, Studies in Religion 15, ’86, 327–36.—JMeinhold, Jesus u. das AT 1896; MKähler, Jesus u. das AT² 1896; AKlöpper, Z. Stellung Jesu gegenüber d. Mos. Gesetz, Mt 5:17–48: ZWT 39, 1896, 1–23; EKlostermann, Jesu Stellung z. AT 1904; AvHarnack, Hat Jesus das atl. Gesetz abgeschafft?: Aus Wissenschaft u. Leben II 1911, 225–36, SBBerlAk 1912, 184–207; KBenz, D. Stellung Jesu zum atl. Gesetz 1914; MGoguel, RHPR 7, 1927, 160ff; BBacon, Jesus and the Law: JBL 47, 1928, 203–31; BBranscomb, Jes. and the Law of Moses 1930; WKümmel, Jes. u. d. jüd. Traditionsged.: ZNW 33, ’34, 105–30; JHempel, D. synopt. Jesus u. d. AT: ZAW 56, ’38, 1–34.—Lk-Ac: JJervell, HTR 64, ’71, 21–36.—EGrafe, D. paulin. Lehre vom Gesetz² 1893; HCremer, D. paulin. Rechtfertigungslehre 1896, 84ff; 363ff; FSieffert, D. Entwicklungslinie d. paul. Gesetzeslehre: BWeiss Festschr. 1897, 332–57; WSlaten, The Qualitative Use of νόμος in the Pauline Ep.: AJT 23, 1919, 213ff; HMosbech, Pls’ Laere om Loven: TT 4/3, 1922, 108–37; 177–221; EBurton, ICC, Gal 1921, 443–60; PFeine, Theol. des NT⁶ ’34, 208–15 (lit.); PBenoit, La Loi et la Croix d’après S. Paul (Ro 7:7–8:4): RB 47, ’38, 481–509; CMaurer, D. Gesetzeslehre des Pls ’41; PBläser, D. Gesetz b. Pls ’41; BReicke, JBL 70, ’51, 259–76; GBornkamm, Das Ende d. Gesetzes ’63; HRaisänen, Paul and the Law² ’87; PRichardson/SWesterholm, et al., Law in Religious Communities in the Rom. Period, ’91 (Torah and Nomos); MNobile, La Torà al tempo di Paolo, alcune ri-flessioni: Atti del IV simposio di Tarso su S. Paolo Apostolo, ed. LPadovese ’96, 93–106 (lit. 93f, n. 1).—Dodd 25–41.—B. 1358; 1419; 1421. DELG s.v. νέμω Ic. Schmidt, Syn. I 333–47. M-M. EDNT. TW. Sv.